This paper investigates the effects of labour market institutions on wage persistence among young European workers at the beginning of their careers. We use ECHP data from 1995 to 2001 for 13 EU countries and estimate a three-level random intercept probit model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity both at the individual and country level. Overall, we find that labour market institutions explain wage persistence. In particular, we find that a high level of employment protection legislation and a high level of bargaining centralization increase wage persistence.
Introduction
Wage mobility has constituted a matter of concern in the last years, as it is perceived as an important issue from a welfare perspective, particularly with reference to wage inequality and social mobility. Recently, several authors have studied the relationship between labour market institutions and wage mobility. Theoretical models predict that strict labour market regulations reduce wage mobility. For instance, a high level of employment protection legislation (EPL) leads to a lower job turnover rate, and, thus, to a decline in a major source of wage mobility (Bertola, 1990) . In addition, the existence of minimum wage legislation and a high level of bargaining centralization contribute to compress the wage distribution (OECD, 2004) .
Quite interestingly, recent empirical studies do not confirm the above mentioned theoretical predictions. In particular, countries with different labour market institutions experience similar wage mobility levels (see, among others, Burkhauser et al. 1997 , Aaberge et al. 2002 and Cardoso 2006 . We contribute to this literature with a novel microeconometric study that controls for observed individual and job related characteristics, observable labour market institutions and allows for unobservable heterogeneity at both the individual and country level. We use a three-level random intercept probit model as our benchmark model. We focus on young European workers at the beginning of their careers for, at least, two reasons. First, young workers constitute a disadvantaged group in the sense that they are over represented in low paid jobs. In addition, young workers experiment more precarious employment and higher job turnover that, in turn, conditions wage persistence and human capital accumulation (Mincer and Ofek, 1982) . Hence, uncovering the determinants of wage persistence may be relevant to understand structural differences in labour market experiences of different worker groups, both within and across countries. Second, by focusing on young workers at the beginning of their careers allows a simpler treatment of the socalled initial condition problem. When the beginning of the observation period does not coincide with the beginning of the stochastic process generating wage experiences, potential non-exogeneity of the conditioning starting state may bias parameter estimates (Heckman, 1981) . In our sample, we do observe the initial wage values and, hence, the initial conditional problem does not arise.
1
For the sake of international analysis, wage persistence is defined with respect to a deciles transition matrix at the European level and we use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) dataset as it contains homogeneous variables and a uniform data gathering methodology across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the statistical model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Econometric Specification
Our econometric specification consists in a probit model with unobserved heterogeneity at both the individual and country level. As observations within groups are more likely to be correlated than observations from different groups, failure to control for heterogeneity may lead to inconsistent estimates and misleading inferences. Hence, we implement a Generalized Linear Latent 
2 Parker and Gardner (2002) applied a similar approach.
3
The probability of experimenting wage persistence may be expressed as: 
The likelihood function, integrating out the random terms, reads:
where Ω = Var (α) and ϕ (2) and ϕ (3) are the density functions of the random effects. As usual, we assume that the random effects are normally distributed with zero mean. The likelihood function is approximated via a Gauss-Hermite quadrature and is maximized by the Newton-Raphson method.
Data
We use a sub-sample from seven-waves, consider an indicator of job changes, as it may be an important source of wage mobility (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994) . We also control for the starting decile. In fact, wage persistence is higher at the extreme deciles of the wage distribution, implying that wage persistence takes a U shaped form, as Table 2 presents wage persistence across countries. The incidence of wage persistence is lower among young workers at the beginning of their job careers in comparison with the overall working population, a result in line with previous findings in the literature (Cardoso, 2006) . This finding suggests that job turnover, a phenomenon especially acute among young workers, plays a key role in explaining wage persistence (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994) . Several factors may explain cross country differences in wage persistence. First, the distribution of individuals and job-related workers' observable characteristics varies across countries. Second, different institutions are likely to influence wage persistence. Finally, disparities in purchasing power may influence wage persistence. In fact, workers living in countries with extreme levels of purchasing power are likely to be allocated in the extreme deciles of the wage distribution, with higher immobility. In fact, this reasoning may explain why Portugal and Denmark -the poorest and richest countries in the sample, respectively -experience the highest levels of wage persistence.
Results
<Insert Table 2 here> <Insert Table 3 here> Our findings support the idea that stricter labour market regulations increase wage persistence 6 . In particular, we find that a higher level of EPL significantly increases wage persistence. The existence of minimum wage legislation, however, has no significant effect on wage persistence. This result may be spurious in the sense that countries where there is no formal minimum wage legislation may have different provisions that, in practice, act as binding arrangements for wage floors (Italy is a remarkable example; see OECD, 2004) . High level of bargaining centralization increases wage persistence with respect to countries characterized by medium level of bargaining centralization. Low level of bargaining centralization has a negative but not significant effect on wage persistence in our benchmark model where we control for heterogeneity at the individual and country. However, in both models that do not take into account of heterogeneity at the country level one finds that low level of bargaining centralization has a significant and positive effect on wage persistence. We take this result as suggestive of the importance of controlling for heterogeneity in order to avoid misleading inferences.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of labour market institutions on wage persistence among young European workers at the beginning of their job careers. Applying a three-level random intercept probit model to ECHP data, we find that individual and job-related observable and unobservable characteristics explain wage persistence. In particular, we find that high educational level and job mobility significantly reduce wage persistence, and, concomitantly, enhance social mobility. We find that more regulated labour markets -with high EPL and a high level of bargaining centralization -experience higher wage persistence, in line with theoretical predictions.
However, we do note that it is important to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level, in order to capture the role of country unobservable characteristics and to avoid misleading inferences and inconsistent estimates. All models also include control for starting decile. *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
